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Social Conflicts about the Definition of Risks: 
The Role of Science
Christoph Lau
There seems to have been a fundamental change in the public agenda of westem 
societies in the last decade. Hazards and safety, risk management and risk 
acceptance are dominant topics of a public rhetoric which begins to displace 
traditional political issues (Beck, 1986; Offe, 1986; Luhmann, 1986). This 
generalized awareness of dangers and hazards tums especially against technologi- 
cal developments and the dynamics of scientific innovation.
Security has, indeed, always been one of the central values of the welfare state 
(Kaufmann 1973). The criticism of technological risks, however, does not mean 
individual security against economic dangers. It aims instead at collective dangers 
which are caused by the scientific and technical civilization. Even if these dangers 
are not very probable, because of their collective character and their relevance to 
common welfare, they develop a social dynamic which treats as central the 
question of who decides on risks that threaten potentially everyone.
The discussion about technological risks has been dominated by the perspec­
tive of natural sciences and technology. These debates concentrate on the 
evidence of the technical causation of damages and on the forecast o f destructive 
developments. However, in the course of the different risk debates -  for 
example, the controversies about nuclear energy and the pollution of air and 
water -  it became clear that scientific and technical definitions of risks are based 
on premises, values and assumptions which are not scientific findings but cultural 
constructions. Questions about what has to be regarded as a risk, which aspects of 
a risk are perceived and investigated, and how the possible dangers are to be 
valued, can only be answered by reference to cultural norms of acceptability.
The limits on causal analysis also become evident when it is impossible to 
connect risks and dangers with one or several defined causes. This is typically 
true for many environmental problems. If risks are only vaguely defined, neither 
the responsible organizations nor the group of persons potentially damaged can be 
exactly determined by means of causal analysis. Frequently, where to begin or to 
stop a causal explanation can be decided only by pragmatic methods. Statements
of causal connection, however, can be used for the distribution of social 
responsibility. They are results o f decisions which are determined as much by 
social and cultural, as by scientific arguments.
The social aspects of risk definition do not even concem predominantly the 
contraversies between experts. The dissent of scientific experts only reveals that 
the question of whether a technological risk should be accepted cannot be 
determined by scientific knowledge alone. As the calculation of potential 
damages and their statistical probability is more and more opposed by public 
consciousness, the consensus on risks and on the foundations of their definition is 
becoming a scarce resource or even a factor of production. Public debates about 
risks can be regarded as a new type of social conflict, because the mere definition 
of a risk has important consequences for the management as well as for the 
population. These conflicts do not surface as direct confrontations but as efforts to 
influence the public definition of dangers by scientific findings and arguments.
Before trying to characterize the role of science in conflicts about technological 
risks in more detail, I shall summarize the specific attributes of these new 
dangers. For reasons of differentiation I will contrast the new risks with two other 
types of cultural risk definition (Cf. Evers/Nowotny, 1987; Beck, 1986; Ewald, 
1986; Douglas/Wildavsky, 1982).
I. Traditional Risks
Traditional risks are voluntarily taken by individuals or groups. The capitalist 
entrepreneur, the investigator or the physician are taking a Professional risk just 
like the officer or the pilot of an airplane. Bearing a risk of this kind belongs to 
the ethos of a particular professional group or a social rank. This positively valued 
consciousness of risk-taking still exists as a part of the normative culture of 
Professionals or of occupational groups. In a trivialized form it can be found as a 
symbol of a particular life-style or subcultural groups.
Traditional risks can be attributed to individuals and are temporally limited. 
They are socially normed and stabilize the social boundaries of groups. At the 
same time, the management and handling of these traditonal risks has always 
been based on differentiated common-sense knowledge of probabilities, on 
Professional traditions and on personal experience and competence. Risks of this 
kind are taken to realize particular appreciated values, as, for example, the honour 
of a dass or rank, scientific progress or the supply of economic goods. They are 
closely connected to the process of group socialization.
In premodern societies all sorts o f threats, losses and catastrophes which could 
not be related to the ethos or the duty of a group were not regarded as risks, but as
general plagues and dangers (Luhmann, 1989). General dangers, according to 
their anonymous and involuntary character, tend to individualize the persons 
threatened by them.
II. Industrial Risks
The second type of risk definition shall be called industrial risk. By the process of 
modernization and the rationalization of economic and professional action the 
management of risks has been rationalized, too. By means of statistical calcula- 
tion different risks can be rationally assessed and compared. This first step in the 
scientification of risk assessment corresponds to the rise of the institution of 
insurance. The costs of damages and losses now can be socialized, although the 
risks are decided on individually. The redistribution of the monetary conse- 
quences among the community of insurants changes the character of risk 
perception and risk behaviour fundamentally (Ewald, 1986; Evers/Nowotny, 
1987). In the course of modernization risks are separated from their normative 
context and become factors of economic calculation. As economic factors risks 
are issues of the collective bargaining between economic interest groups. By this 
collectivization of individual risks the causal responsibility is disconnected from 
the monetary compensation guaranteed by the community of insurants.
There are several significant and complex consequences of the emergence of a 
security society. The traditional interpretations of heroic risk taking become more 
and more obsolete or are limited to professional or sports activities. Moreover, the 
values which are endangered by risks, such as life, property and work place, are 
equalized by compensation. Risks which are calculated statistically cannot 
stabilize group identities. The transfer o f costs from the injured person to the 
community of insurants means, at the same time, the levelling of cultural 
differences of risks by the logic of quantitative comparison. The individual 
responsibility for the consequences of risks is transformed into the economic and 
rational Obligation to be insured against Claims for damages and personal losses. 
In other words, moral risk definitions are replaced by economic utility calcula- 
tions. The preconditions of this process of rationalization are the ascription of 
effects to individuals and the possibility of measuring the damages. However, 
these conditions do not exist in the case of ecological catastrophes.
III. New Technological Risks
The new technological risks are more or less a combination of industrial risks and 
general dangers to life, which are not conceived as risks. This becomes obvious 
when we take a look at the main characteristics of the new risks.
Just as they are mostly not accepted voluntarily, new technological risks can 
motivate mutual Support and solidarity beyond existing group boundaries. The 
new social movements are examples of the diffuse character of such associations 
which allow only temporary alliances (Raschke, 1987).
Most of the new technological risks can only be calculated with great 
difficulties. There is legitimate doubt whether statistical risk assessment is an 
adequate method for evaluating singulär catastrophes. Nuclear and biotechnologi- 
cal risks may not be very probable. The scope and complexity of their effects, 
however, lead to a degree of uncertainty that makes a rational calculation very 
problematic.
In spite of the fact that the technological risks are not taken voluntarily by 
society, they are, nevertheless, caused by decisions and actions of individuals. 
These paradoxical circumstances may be explained by the unintended collective 
effects of many individual decisions, as in the case of air pollution. Decisive for 
the perception of dangerous consequences of collective effects is the discovery of 
these causal relations by science. Aggregate effects, having existed in all periods 
of history, become societal risks by scientific causal evidence. Only scientific 
knowledge discovers individual responsibility for global dangers and turns them 
from fate to option.
The falling apart o f risk-taking and exposure to risks is also responsible for the 
paradox noted above. The owner o f a nuclear power Station surely runs a certain 
risk of loosing his investment in the case o f an accident. But this risk is out o f  
proportion to the dangers to which the population is exposed. The Separation o f  
risk decision and exposure to dangers corresponds to the principle o f functional 
differentiation. Functional differentiation in this sense means that the specific 
rationality o f a subsystem tends to neglect the precarious consequences o f a 
decision for other subsystems.
Above all, the differentiation of responsibility and danger results from the 
widened ränge of effects caused by interventions in natural balances which have 
been so far unknown. Scientific methods which allow operating on natural 
microprocesses (biotechnology, chemistry, nuclear technology) are producing 
consequent effects which cannot be traced back to its causal sources without 
difficulty. In this perspective science and technology produce objective risks 
which have a new quality compared to industrial risks.
The acceptance of technological risks cannot be justified by the Professional 
ethos or the ideology of a group. This is true at least since the erosion of the
different utopias of social progress. For a long time the idea of a continous 
scientific and technical progress provided reasons for the acceptance of risks as 
the “costs o f modemization” . In the meantime the ethos of modemization and 
progress has lost much of its suggestive power. The acceptance of risk is no 
longer recognized as a civil virtue according to which risks are the price for a 
better social future. I presume that this development can be directly explained by 
the characteristics of technological dangers.
Since they tend to be potentially universal, the confrontation with these dangers 
cannot be rewarded any more according to the values of a community or a nation. 
Likewise, the financial compensation by insurances makes no sense because of 
the inpredictability of effects. The problems of social attribution give them the 
status of natural disasters which injure human life under the laws of statistics or 
fate. As they are, on the other hand, a product of social action they fundamentally 
threaten the legitimacy of industrial societies. If it is true that the continously 
modemizing society is the cause of fatal catastrophes, the process of modemiza­
tion must be regarded as a quasi-natural process which is beyond cultural norms 
and economic calculations. Risk production and risk acceptance drift apart not 
only as a result of processes of cultural leaming but because of the specific logic 
of risk definition.
To the extent that the new risks cannot be attributed to particular groups they 
have an individualizing effect. When dangers to life and health are ascribed to the 
anonymity of accident, the belonging to social groups in terms of dass, 
occupation, neighbourhood, sex and generation, loses some of its importance. In 
view of the new technological risks all men are equal, even if this does not 
actually prove true. The individual tends to feel released from social obligations 
and value relations. It can be assumed that this process will increase individualiz­
ing tendencies, which can be observed in westem societies at the present (Beck, 
1983).
On the other hand, increasing individualism and its economic consequences 
will probably influence the perception of risk and intensify a generalized 
consciousness of dangers. The more the endangering of social identity is 
experienced by individuals, the more the readiness to identify oneself with objects 
whose integrity is threatened will rise. It is comparatively unimportant whether 
these objects o f projection are perishing whales or the “sick German forest” (Lau, 
1985). It is not an accident that this compassion for nature emerged in a historical 
period of increased individualization comparatively independent of objective 
developments.
Whereas traditional risks are well defined and circumscribed, whether by 
Professional knowledge or social conventions, the new risks are in many ways 
unspecified. For a traditional merchant who plans a precarious trade Operation, a 
physician who is testing an unknown substance, or a general who prepares a 
battle, profit and loss are definitely circumscribed quantities which are more or 
less evident. The same is true for the period o f  time during which they expose
themselves or their group to a risk. Only the outcome of the experiment to which 
they subject themselves is doubtful. In comparison, the new risks are remarkably 
undefined. This does not only refer to the nature and extent of potential damages 
which often remain uncertain. The temporal duration of negative effects, too, 
seems to be almost unlimited. In most cases traditional risk takers could outline 
the period of risk. Times of danger could be differentiated from times of relative 
safety. This temporal limitation does not only facilitate psychic coping strategies, 
but also allows the social accentuation of risk periods and their Separation from 
everyday time.
The vanishing of this differentiation, which is reinforced by the new technologi- 
cal risks, has far-reaching consequences. It puts the individuals in a Situation 
where they have to act normally under the threat of omnipresent and unlimited 
dangers. It can be expected that this contradictory demand may lead to a cynical 
or naive habituation to technological dangers.
IV. New Risks and Societal Conflicts
The deficient and uncertain definition of technological risks in temporal, spatial, 
social and causal repects gives rise to conflicts which are, in first ränge, 
argumentative debates about the social definition and classification of hazards. 
These struggles for knowledge are motivated by the emotional load connected 
with global risks. More relevant for a sociological perspective is the fact that there 
is always a multitude of political, economic and social interests affected by the 
concrete definition of a risk.
The theme of these disputes only outwardly seems to be the radical avoidance 
of risks. Behind this manifest content of debates there are hidden conflicts about 
the distribution of risks and their consequences which cannot be directly set on 
the public agenda.
There is an analogy between the history of the labour movement and the new 
social movements. The confrontation between the opponents and the supporters 
of risk taking has concealed a development which has been going on for some 
time. As freedom from technological dangers becomes a new utopia, which 
cannot be realized today, the problem of a just distribution of risks shifts to the 
centre of discourse. The development of the security state which we are 
experiencing now shows some parallels to the development of the European 
welfare state (Evers/Nowotny, 1987). The new social movements tum out to be 
the major promoters of a successful change in the public agenda from economic 
inequality to risk distribution and control. At least the realistic part o f the 
environmental movement considers the risk debate as a meliorative effort to
limitate and decrease the risk potential. This reformist strategy more or less leads 
to the replacement of a logic of prevention by a logic of distribution.
Normally conflicts about risk definitions take place on the level of public 
discourse. In these debates arguments and scientific information serve as 
resources in a game played by collective actors. The sphere of public discourse 
becomes the symbolic battle field of interest groups, even if it is often concealed 
by the factual, scientific character of the arguments.
An important part of the reality of modern societies is influenced by risk 
definitions. This concems a number of elements.
1. The size of the group of threatened persons. According to the definition of a 
risk, individuals can be differently exposed to danger depending on, for 
instance, their age, sex or dass.
2. The characteristics of the group of risk producers. National interventions can 
be deduced from scientific results about causal relations. They can also serve 
for the moral or legal attribution of guilt and fault. Depending on scientific 
evidence the group of responsibles can consist of many small enterprises or 
consumers or of one big Company.
3. The probability of dangers and catastrophes. The statistical assessment of 
probabilities influences the profit and loss account of the management and the 
strategies of policy Intervention and of opposing groups. On the one hand, 
statistical risk assessment may increase the feeling of safety. On the other hand, 
statistical calculations produce a feeling of uncertainty, as they cannot supply 
information for the individual case. In this function they may promote a sort of 
“statistically produced solidarity” .
4. The costs o f risks. The distribution of the costs of compensation and of 
prevention is one of the most controversial issues of risk debates. In a more 
general meaning risk definitions also influence the costs of risk management, 
of political participation and protest and of scientific research on risks.
5. The chances and benefits resulting from risk taking. The profitability of a 
technological investment is directly connected with its long-term acceptance 
and therefore with the scientific definition of its risks.
6. The visibility of damages. The new risks can hardly be perceived by 
individuals. One can experience them only by knowing. Certain risk defini­
tions, however, allow the physical symbolization of a danger. They determine 
if these vicarious symbols, such as a nuclear reactor, can serve as meaningful 
memorials for protest actions. If this is not the case, the symbolic representa- 
tion of dangers remains in the exclusive sphere of scientific competence.
7. The possibility of individual reactions to a risk. By specific risk definitions 
possible alternatives of individual reaction are given. The opportunities of 
removal, o f changing everyday behaviour or of protest and political influence 
depend not only on material conditions, but also very directly on the prevailing 
cognitive mapping of the problem.
8. The distribution of expertise and competence. Risk definitions decide to a 
large extent which scientific or technical discipline is regarded as legitimately 
competent for the assessment of effects, for observation and reporting. Public 
debates on risks have an influence on the spheres of competence, on the 
financial support and the power of scientific communities. Scientists can have 
their own interest in a special version of a risk and that may affect their 
judgement. For that reason the development of scientific disciplines or 
communities is influenced at least indirectly by public controversies about 
dangers.
It is possible that these dimensions of the new conflicts -  exposure, power, costs 
and knowledge -  coincide, but in principle they vary independently. It is for this 
reason that they cannot be represented by a definite structure of conflict, similar 
to that of capital and labour, and that it is difficult to institutionalize them. The 
Situation gets even more complicated as the new conflict pattems react on the 
traditional economic conflicts (Heine/Mautz, 1988). For this reason Strategie 
political action becomes more difficult than before for all collective actors.
Strategie success in traditional economic conflicts can be measured by the 
medium of money. Such a symbolic medium which can indicate definite gains or 
losses of risk conflicts is not in sight with respect to the new risks. All efforts to 
establish undisputed Standards of risk assessment have been frustrated by the 
incompatability of the subjective and the statistical assessment of dangers. This 
makes clear why scientific knowledge and not strikes, votes or political influence 
is the primary resource of conflict.
V. Science and Public Conflicts About Risks
Scientific knowledge can be used in these conflicts as an instrument of power, 
because it influences the radius of action of the different collective actors. Such a 
cognitive power can be understood as a function of the zone of uncertainty which 
is controlled by scientific information (Crozier/Friedberg, 1979). Uncertainty 
about the conditions of future action can be increased or reduced by scientific 
arguments. When a group of activists succeeds in establishing a credible relation 
between the pollution of sea-water and dying fish, the Strategie possibilities of the 
respective chemical enterprises will be reduced. On the other hand low measured 
values of radiation can signify more safety for consumers and therefore more 
alternatives of consumption.
When the individual estimate of dangers is no longer based on personal 
experience and traditional common sense is losing its value, everyday activities
becom e dependent on information supplied by science and public media. The 
reliability and validity o f this knowledge can only vaguely be estimated by 
individual knowledge users. It is for this reason, too, that producers o f  knowledge 
about risks get in a Situation o f competition.
It seems to be obvious that conflicts about risks are changing the relation 
between scientific knowledge production and the public use of this knowledge in 
a fundamental way. The conventional model of science utilization is based on the 
deductive transfer of results to social practice. It is clear that the premises of this 
concept get problematic under the conditions of public disputes. The more 
scientific findings and arguments are used as Strategie resources the more the idea 
of a technical and instrumental use of objective and definite scientific results 
becomes obsolete or even proves to be a social fiction (Lau/Beck, 1989).
Instead, science utilization in public debates follows the logic of collective 
argumentation and legitimation. Scientific arguments are detached from the 
interests of their users and develop their own dynamics. Once expressed, 
scientific arguments will more or less bind political actors to a specific point of 
view. The more different political groups are involved in the conflict, and the 
more different stocks of knowledge are made accessible, the more difficult it 
becomes to strategically select scientific results and to monopolize particular 
sources of knowledge.
A double conclusion can be drawn from this relative autonomy of public 
disputes about risks. On the one hand, it is clear that the production of scientific 
knowledge is losing, to a certain degree, its nimbus of objectivity, of social 
neutrality and of reliability, which has been decisive for the external reputation of 
science until now. By the institutionalization of counter-expertise not only is the 
scientific dissent about facts made public, but it also becomes visible that the 
methodological basis of scientific research can hardly guarantee the certainty 
which is expected by the public. Scientific knowledge itself becomes a source of 
uncertainty. The publicity of criticism of science and the wide-spread awareness 
of a relativistic and opportunistic use of scientific results are characteristic of a 
period in which science is partially losing its credibility. Paradoxically, at the 
same time, the dependence on scientific results is increasing. On the other hand, 
the participants of collective disputes about risks are becoming co-producers of 
scientific definitions. By the special logic of argumentation the complex but 
highly specialized supply of scientific knowledge is selected and transformed 
according to argumentative necessities and constraints. Scientific information is 
reformulated and synthesized by the participants with reference to their different 
interests. Paradoxically the autonomy of the argumentative use of scientific 
findings grows in the same way as public debates become dependent on science.
It is doubtful if scientific research can be characterized any longer as being free 
from social interests. By the emerging power of definition of scientific knowledge 
about risks the anticipated conditions of science utilization are introduced into the 
process of research as criteria of selection and control. Generally an increased
influence of public policy on science as well as an increased influence of Science 
on society can be observed (Weingart, 1983). This process of interpenetration can 
only be effective because the division of labour between both spheres has not yet 
been officially suspended.
The mentioned problems of control, ascription and validity are typical for 
cognitive confrontations of this kind. These communicative enterprises, however, 
are producing a reality of danger on which all participants (including science) are 
finally dependent in different ways.
The predominant role of science in confiicts about risks means, first of all, a 
devaluation of everyday knowledge. If arguments are to be accepted, they have to 
refer to relevant scientific knowledge, even if this reference is critical of science. 
Value-orientated and traditionalistic arguments are more effective if they are 
related to the causal constructions of science. It is very difficult to condemn, for 
instance, biotechnology as deviltry without reference to the nature of its fateful 
consequences (van den Daele, 1988).
In this way risk debates are promoting the process of formal rationalization by 
which arguments get more systematic, more consistent and more differentiated. 
But the very dependence on the formal procedures of science offers numerous 
possibilities of concealing one-sided interests. This may be surprising only if one 
assumes an objectivistic concept of science (Bonß/Hartmann, 1985). The dis- 
missal o f this ideal suggests that applied research of the modern type is mainly 
oriented by experimental or practical success and not by the aim of gaining 
theoretical knowledge. The relativistic criticism of science may have important 
consequences. It offers a basis for legitimating the opportunistic, Strategie use of 
scientific results which we can observe in the case of risk controversies.
The more the institutional boundaries between practical utilization of knowl­
edge and scientific research are abolished and the principles of methodological 
criticism win recognition in the public the more the field of scientific risk 
assessment is becoming a playground of actors who try to succeed with their 
version of risk interpretation. Science is possibly losing its role as an arbitrator of 
cognitive confiicts and is becoming a supplier of argumentative resources or may 
even join the game.
VI. Some Typical Strategies of Risk Definition
In the following I shall illustrate the changed role of science by three typical 
strategies of risk definition.
1) The redefinition o f  technologically produced risks as natural dangers. If it is 
possible to present a technological risk as a natural threat, the conflict potential is
being neutralized. The risk is virtually excluded from the context of societal 
responsibility and control and integrated within the sphere of general dangers to 
life. As its existence is no longer regarded as a result of human decision, the risk 
cannot produce social conflicts, but only individual or collective efforts of coping. 
For example, the endangering of a biological species can be explained by the 
epidemic diffusion of a “natural” virus. Similarly the genetic manipulation of 
organisms can be interpreted as something “that nature has been doing all the 
time” . The comparison of technically produced radiation with natural radiation 
dosages has a relativating and appeasing effect. As the acceptance of natural 
dangers is regarded as normal, the renaturalization of risks gives rise to a feeling 
of normality and releases the people responsible from legitimation pressure. 
Typical arguments in this context are evidences of natural causes of a danger and 
the comparison of a new technological risk with similar facts which can be traced 
back to natural sources.
As the example of natural radiation dosage shows, those strategies may 
sometimes be successful. Confronted, however, with a universal suspicion of risk 
these strategies frequently fail. The ecological paradigm, based on complex 
causal networks, works against the Separation of single causal relations and 
relates even the most natural event to human interventions. The increased 
reproduction of a destructive parasite, for instance, can be explained by the 
extinction of a specific species of birds. The concept of ecological interdepen- 
dence exposes technological innovations to a principally unlimited suspicion of 
risk and negative effects which questions the simple contrast of nature and 
society.
2) The normative reevaluation o f  risks. Another strategy aims at the presenta- 
tion of a danger as a risk voluntarily taken by a particular group or community. 
The definition of nuclear war which had been accepted for a long time may be 
regarded as an example of this strategy. According to the then prevailing doctrine, 
the risk of a nuclear war was defined as the price which the NATO states had to 
pay for the defense of westem values.
The conflict about nuclear energy may show a similar reference to the ethos of 
a community. West Germany, for instance, is characterized as an economic 
community which is poor in natural resources and has to stand up against 
international competition. According to this argument, it therefore has to take the 
risk of nuclear energy. The propagation of a normative risk acceptance does not 
work, however, if the responsibility for a risk and the exposure to a risk are 
separated. The example of the more traditional hazard of getting AIDS shows 
which conditions enable the Standards of a group to regulate risky behaviour. In 
the case of AIDS there was a change in behaviour after science had attributed the 
risk to homosexuals, to the emergence of informal group norms and to an 
integration of the risk definition into the orientation pattem of the group. In the 
case of technological dangers group processes like this can be effective only if the 
risk can be at least partially reduced by individual behaviour.
3) The individualization o f  risk. A third general strategy, the individualization 
of risk, can be effective in two forms. Firstly, it can be assumed, by the statistical 
assessment of a low probability and by the calculation of monetary compensation, 
that the risk can be rationally managed by individuals, even if the preconditions 
for these calculations do not exist. The cognitive certainty produced by this 
rationalization is founded on the more or less credible illusion that catastrophic 
risks can be calculated in terms of individual costs and benefits. The scientific 
character of risk assessment suggests in these cases that statistical knowledge can 
be used for the individual orientation of behaviour. Even if a factual catastrophe 
would go beyond any possibility of compensation, the nimbus of quantitative 
calculation seems to correspond to a need of cognitive security.
Secondly, risks can be individualized by stressing the individual causation of 
risks and the responsibility for their consequences. An example for this is the 
controversy about the “dying of forests” in West Germany (Roqueplo, 1986). 
Though it can be proved that damages to the forest are due to a highly complex 
chain of causation, individual motor traffic was singled out as the main cause and 
the most important field of policy intervention. When risks are defined as caused 
by individual behaviour, the dangers seem to be preventable by individual 
decision, even if this is not the case. Sometimes it may be more promising to 
delegate risk management to individual responsibility than to chose coercive 
measures. The behaviour to willingly volunteer and the appeal to moral Standards 
will normalize the consciousness of danger and increase its acceptance.
The individualization of collective risks corresponds to personal needs of 
coping. Even if dangers are anonymous and have world-wide consequences, 
individual strategies of risk reduction can serve as antidotes against the feeling of 
helplessness.
These strategies of risk definition can only illustrate some aspects of risk 
conflicts. Until now, the new field of cognitive politics has been scarcely 
investigated by the social sciences. If it is true that the horizon of technological 
hazards and dangers becomes an essential part of the reality of modern societies, 
the role of science is getting precarious. On the one hand, scientific research 
contributes directly to the increase in objective risks. On the other hand, it is only 
because of science that we can become aware of these dangers. I think that it is 
this double role of science as a producer of objective risks and as a medium of 
public conflict which transforms modern societies into knowledge societies.
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